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ABSTRACT
Our objective is to obtain an accurate estimate of the degree of intergenerational income
mobility in Canada. We use income tax information on about 400,000 father-son pairs, and
find  intergenerational earnings elasticities to be about 0.2. Earnings mobility tends to be
slightly greater than income mobility, but non-parametric techniques uncover significant non-
linearities in both of these relationships. Intergenerational earnings mobility is greater at the
lower end of the income distribution than at the upper end, and displays an inverted V-shape
elsewhere. Intergenerational income mobility follows roughly the same pattern, but is much
lower at the very top of the income distribution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to examine the degree to which individuals “inherit” their
economic status, that is the degree of intergenerational mobility. What is the extent of the
economic advantage conferred to offspring of the rich? On the other hand, is poverty a state
that is passed on to subsequent generations?
The growing literature devoted to the estimation of intergenerational income mobility
in the OECD countries is for the most part based upon a linear regression model. The focus of
attention has been on the potential biases associated with life-cycle differences between (most
often) fathers and sons, and measurement error associated with transitory fluctuations in
incomes or mistakes in reporting. In spite of the fact that some theories are specifically
concerned with non-linearities, and in spite of the fact that related empirical analyses based on
transition matrices suggest they may be present in the data, the possibility that the linear
model is mis-specified has not been addressed in any detail.
This is a major theme in our study. We focus on the relationship between the adult
incomes of a cohort of Canadian men born between 1963 and 1966, and living in households
with a father present. The analysis is based upon administrative data associated with the
Canadian income tax. As a result our sample size is very large, close to 400,000 father-son
pairs. The data have a number of strengths, and we try to play to these while at the same time
working around any weaknesses. In particular, administrative data offer information not only
on the amount of income, but also its composition. Accordingly we examine both2
intergenerational earnings mobility and income mobility. Further, the large sample size
permits the use of non-parametric techniques to examine non-linearities in the degree of
intergenerational mobility.
We begin by offering an overview of the existing literature, and then proceed in three
steps. First, using our data we address concerns raised in the literature, namely potential biases
originating in life-cycle differences between fathers and sons and measurement error
associated with the derivation of permanent income. Second, we examine potential limitations
of the data: the possibility of biases due to sample selection, and under-reporting of income.
Finally we explore non-linear patterns by first examining quartile, decile, and percentile
transition matrices, and then adopting non-parametric techniques, specifically a version of
nearest-neighbourhood estimation.
Among our findings is the result that there is a good deal of intergenerational mobility
among Canadian men. On average the intergenerational correlation of earnings and market
incomes between fathers and sons is probably about 0.2, a value that until recently was
considered to be the consensus in the United States. Nonetheless, our use of non-parametric
techniques uncovers significant non-linearities in this relationship. The degree of
intergenerational earnings mobility is much greater at the lower end of the income distribution
than at the upper end. The elasticity of father and son earnings is about 0.0 at the bottom
percentile and rises to about 0.4 at the top percentile. However, it follows an inverted V-shape
over intermediate parts of the distribution. Income mobility follows a roughly similar pattern,
but is much lower at the very top of the distribution. The intergenerational elasticity between
father and son incomes at the top percentile is almost 0.8.3
Some of these patterns can be understood in the context of a borrowing constraints
model. However, we stop short of interpreting them as the result of specific policy
interventions, and suggest that in order to do so will require more research from other
countries on the degree and pattern of non-linearities in intergenerational mobility.
II. METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE SURVEY
The existing literature has examined intergenerational income mobility in two complementary
ways: by least squares estimation of an autoregressive model linking a child’s income (as an
adult) to the parent’s income, and by the construction of a transition matrix relating the child’s
position in the income distribution to the parent’s position.
In the first case a child’s income is expressed as a (linear) function of his or her
parent’s income. If Y represents permanent income (generally measured in logarithms), t the
child’s generation, and t-1 the parent’s generation then the standard data generating process is
assumed to be:
Yi(t) = b0 + b1Yi(t-1) + ei (1)
where the data are at the individual level, i denotes a father-son pair, and ei is a random
component usually assumed to be distributed as N(0,s2). The constant term represents the
change in income common to generation t, while the coefficient b1 indicates the extent to
which income levels are related to those of the parent’s, that is the extent of intergenerational
mobility.
1
An accurate estimate of b1 is the main concern of studies that adopt this approach. If   
b1 is less than one the income distribution is said to regress to the mean: while parents with4
incomes above (or below) the mean will have children with above (or below) average income
levels the deviation from the mean will not be as great. This should not be too surprising in
advanced industrialized societies. However, the larger b1 (even if it is less than one) the more
likely that an individual as an adult will inhabit the same economic position as his or her
parents, that is the greater the persistence in intergenerational income levels. Even small
values of b1 confer substantial advantages to the children of the well off.
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Models like equation (1) have been estimated with data from a number of countries,
but the research with U.S. data is the most extensive. Altonji and Dunn (1991), Behrman and
Taubman (1990), Mulligan (1997), Peters (1992), Shea (1997), Solon (1992), and
Zimmerman (1992) represent some recent examples, while earlier research covering several
countries in addition to the U.S. is summarized in Becker and Tomes (1986). The latter
suggest that a consensus value for b1 seems to be 0.2. These findings, however have been
criticized as being biased because of measurement error and sample selection problems, which
are discussed by Atkinson, Maynard, and Trinder (1983), Jenkins (1987), and Solon
(1989,1992). Solon, for example, notes that ideally Yi(t) and Yi(t-1) in equation (1) should be
measures of permanent income, but often researchers are forced to use a measure of income in
a given year, say 
~
Yi (t-1) = Yi(t-1)+ vi, where vi represents a transitory shock to income. This
results in an errors in variables problem leading the estimated coefficient (
~
b ) to differ from
the true coefficient according to a factor determined by the ratio of the variance of vi to that of
Yi, so that 
~
b (1+ s v
2/ s Y
2 ) = b1 . Solon (1989) suggests that 
~
b  should be inflated by a  factor
of 1.3 to 1.8 when a representative sample is being used. He notes, however, that many studies
are based upon samples that are overly homogenous so that the sample variance of Y in effect5
understates the population variance, and thereby exacerbates the measurement error bias. The
consensus estimate of 0.2 suggested by Becker and Tomes is based upon studies subject to
these biases. Behrman and Taubman (1990), Lillard and Reville (1997), Mulligan (1997) and
Solon (1992) correct for these problems and estimate b1 to be about 0.4 to 0.5, the former
offering a preferred value as high as 0.6. Zimmerman (1992) also reports an estimate of 0.4,
but Peters (1992) using the same data obtains estimates that vary between 0.1 and 0.2 as do
Couch and Dunn (1997) who use the PSID.
The breadth of this literature is not as great as the number of studies would suggest.
The data for all of the U.S. surveys is based on only two different surveys (either the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics or the National Longitudinal Survey) and upon sample sizes that
can be quite small. As an example, Solon (1992) uses a sample of 348 father-son pairs from
the PSID, while Zimmerman (1992) uses 876 from the NLS. Some of the sample sizes in
Cooper et al. (1993) are less than 100 observations. Couch and Dunne (1997) and Couch and
Lillard (1997) point out that exclusion rules used in the construction of the sample for analysis
may have an important influence on the estimates obtained. Given that most researchers are
using the same data sets, the small sample size in the context of specification and
measurement problems contributes to the diversity of estimates obtained.
Research from other countries is more limited, but growing. Atkinson, Maynard, and
Trinder (1983) provide evidence based on data from a single British city that b1 is about 0.4 to
0.45 depending upon the way income is measured, and Dearden, Machin, and Reed (1997)
offer an estimate of about 0.4 to 0.6 using a more representative sample. Gustafsson (1994)
and Björklund and Jänti (1997a) studying Swedish data obtain an estimate of about 0.2 to
0.25. Björklund and Jänti (1997b), Mulligan (1997, chapter 7), and Solon (1997) offer6
detailed surveys of the international evidence, but perhaps the most striking issue, from our
perspective, is the dearth of Canadian evidence. To our knowledge the issue of
intergenerational mobility has not received a great deal of attention by Canadian economists.
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In a preliminary version of our research (Corak and Heisz, 1995) we obtained an estimate of a
little less than 0.2, but this study paid scant attention to measurement issues inherent in the
data. Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) obtain a similar result using survey data.
The second approach to the study of intergenerational income mobility, the derivation
of a transition matrix, is complementary to the use of autoregressive models. This approach
involves dividing the population into equal sized groups ranked in order of income, and
presenting the distribution of parents and children across these groups. The value of the
transition matrix is that it offers a more detailed depiction of intergenerational mobility. Peters
(1992) and Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) present typical examples. In both studies about
one third of sons born to fathers in the bottom quartile rose to the top half of the income
distribution. They also find that there is less mobility at the top and bottom of the distribution,
with sons born to fathers at the two extremes of the income distribution much more likely to
occupy the same position as adults than sons born to fathers with incomes in the second and
third quartiles. However, this may also illustrate a disadvantage. As Atkinson, Maynard, and
Trinder (1983, p.83) point out, the non-linear pattern could in part reflect ceilings and floors at
the top and bottom of the matrix: upward mobility is not possible for those born at the top, nor
is downward mobility for those born at the bottom. As a result the degree of immobility at the
top and bottom is exaggerated. The use of regression models is not subject to this limitation.
Indeed, the possibility of non-linearities has been noted by researchers estimating
autoregressions. Solon (1992) augments equation (1) with the square of the father’s income,7
but finds, in large part because of the small size of his sample, that it is not significant.
Mulligan (1997, p.193) also finds no evidence of non-linearities, and suggests that this may be
in part due to the fact that the PSID underrepresents individuals at the top of  the income
distribution. In contrast, Behrman and Taubman (1990) using the PSID, and Lillard (1998)
and Peters (1992) using the NLSY find that higher order terms are statistically significant.
Nonlinearities are an important element in theories of intergenerational income
dynamics. The major contribution to this field is the work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986)
and Becker (1991), as well as Bénabou (1994) and  Durlauf (1994, 1996). Becker and Tomes
(1986) model intergenerational mobility in the context of a human capital model reflecting the
decisions of parents to consume their income or invest it in their children. They incorporate
capital market constraints and  thereby raise the possibility that the correlation between family
income and the child’s adult income may be greater among low income families than high
income families. Mulligan (1997) offers a clear exposition of this model and its implications
for nonlinearities. Durlauf’s rationale for persistent intergenerational poverty is based upon
neighbourhood effects associated with the quality and financing of schooling. Some empirical
work has incorporated insights drawn from these models to include additional variables in the
estimation of equation (1) or to stratify samples in particular ways, but there does not appear
to be a consensus in this literature on the nature and extent of nonlinear patterns.
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III. REGRESSION RESULTS USING LINEAR SPECIFICATIONS
Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) have paid the closest attention to the measurement and
methodological issues that may bias estimates of equation (1). Their work is responsible for a8
reassessment of the degree of intergenerational mobility in the U.S. and suggests that there is
considerably less mobility than previously thought. This is the starting point of our analysis.
In contrast to their work, and to much of the literature, we employ information drawn
from income tax records. Our sample size is very large and not subject to problems of attrition
or reporting errors. We examine a cohort of men aged 16 to 19 years of age in 1982 who filed
an income tax return at some point between 1982 and 1986 (while still at home), and who had
a “father” present during that year.
5 The family linkages through the income tax records are
produced as a part of the construction of the T1 Family File (T1FF) by Statistics Canada,
which is described in the Appendix. Among other things the T1FF permits us to establish a
link between the Social Insurance Numbers (SINs) of fathers and sons. Further by using the
raw income tax files we are able to trace the incomes of the fathers back to 1978 (the first year
in which the T1 information is available), and the incomes of sons forward to 1995, when they
were 29 to 32 years of age. To remain in the sample the sons must have filed an income tax
return in 1995. In addition, we follow Solon (1992) by using only the oldest sons when more
than one son has been matched to the same father. The analysis is based on earnings as well as
on total market income (defined as before tax income from all market sources including
earnings, net self-employment income, and asset income.)
6 All data are expressed in constant
1986 dollars using the CPI as the deflator.
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The first issue we explore with these data concerns the bias associated with annual
income measures as opposed to a measure of permanent income. Solon (1992) suggests that
multi-year averages of the father’s income will reduce the importance of the transitory
component of income, and increase the signal to noise ratio. The maximum number of periods
over which we average is five (1978 through 1982).9
Table 1 offers the descriptive statistics associated with each of the two measures for
the subset of our data in which the average income of the father is greater than or equal to $1
over the five available years. In the case of earnings, described in panel A, there are 339,951
father-son pairs with the father’s average earnings ranging from $1 to over $1.829 million.
The average earnings is $31,388. There are 389,348 father-son pairs with information on total
market income, with the average income of fathers being slightly higher at $35,586.
The estimating equation incorporates the ages of both fathers and sons in order to
correct for the fact that they are not being observed at the same point in their life cycle. Thus
the model we use is:
Yi(t) = b0 +  b1Yi (t-1) +  b2 AgeSon + b3 AgeSon
2 +




Where Yi  represents the natural logarithm of income possibly averaged over several
consecutive years, and age is measured in years.
8 Table 2 presents the estimates of b1 from
Least Squares regressions for both earnings and total market income. Each panel of the table
offers the regression results using each of the various averages of father’s income possible: the
first column offering results from annual data, the second from successive two year averages,
and so on to the single estimate using the five year average. Sample sizes vary for each
estimation and are indicated, along with the standard errors, below the coefficient estimate.
The downward bias of the single year estimates is evident: the estimates increase in magnitude
with each year over which the average is taken. With respect to earnings in Panel A the
estimates gradually converge to 0.131 using the full five years of data. The ratio of this
coefficient to that of those based on annual data ranges from 1.15 to 1.3, roughly about the10
lower bound of the range suggested by Solon when problems of an overly homogeneous
sample are absent. The two estimates using four year averages are within two standard errors
of this figure, as are the three estimated using three year averages. The general pattern is the
same for total market income (see Panel B of Table 1). In this case the single-year estimates
understate those based on the five-year average by about 30 to 60 percent. The elasticity
between the market incomes of fathers and sons, at 0.194 in the case of the five year average,
is higher than that between their earnings. In sum, these findings suggest that it is necessary to
conduct the analysis using at least a three year average of the father’s income, and that the five
year horizon would appear to be long enough to reduce the bias due to transitory income
fluctuations.
The robustness of these findings to the sample selection rules employed, the way in
which adjustments for life cycle differences is made, and the choice of the father’s income
variable are assessed in Table 3. All of the results in this table are based upon five year
averages of the father’s income measure. The four rows labeled 1 in each of the panels of
Table 3 repeat the results in the last column of Table 2. There are three major findings. First,
the selection rules used to define the sample seem to have an important influence on the
estimates of the elasticities. This influence seems to be restricted to whether individuals with
zero (or negative) income are included in the sample before the average is calculated. If
fathers must have at least $1 of income in each of the five years over which the average is
calculated (as opposed to the average being at least $1) the earnings-earnings elasticity
increases from 0.131 to 0.228 (see rows 1 and 2 in Panel A). The elasticity does not change
much beyond this as the cut-off is raised further, reaching 0.242 at a cut-off of $3,000.
Further, the use of a $1 dollar cut-off leads to similar estimates for the earnings-earnings and11
income-income elasticities, about 0.23 to 0.24. Second, life-cycle differences between fathers
and sons do not seem to make much of  difference. If no controls for age are included in the
regression model the estimated elasticity is the same as those including a quadratic in father
and son ages. This finding is robust to other specifications, to the inclusion of controls for the
son’s marital status, and to the use of all sons (not just the oldest). When the sample is
restricted to just the 32 year olds the earnings elasticity is slightly higher (0.140), and when it
is restricted to just the 29 year olds it is slightly lower (0.117). The market income elasticities
seem to be almost completely unaffected by any of these considerations. Finally, the elasticity
of the son’s earnings with respect to the father’s total market income is estimated to be 0.192,
essentially the same as the income-income elasticity.
9
The sensitivity of the earnings results to sample selection rules is also highlighted in
Panel D of the table, which contrasts the Least Squares estimates with quantile regressions
about the median. The earnings results are not robust to the change in estimation strategy, but
those for incomes are essentially the same. Least Squares and quantile regression yield results
that are much closer when fathers are required to have at least $1 of earnings in each of five
years: 0.228 versus 0.206.
Thus, taking into account some of the concerns raised in the literature—biases
associated with measurement error, life-cycle adjustments, and the exclusion rules used in
determining the analysis sample—our the best estimate of the elasticity between father and
sons earnings in the Canadian economy is probably around 0.2, perhaps a little lower or a little
higher depending upon the exclusion rules used to determine the sample.12
IV. REPRESENTATIVENESS AND ACCURACY OF THE DATA
This leaves aside the whole issue of the extent to which administrative data are comparable to
survey data. There would seem to be two associated issues. The first concerns the
representativeness of our sample. While we have a large data set, it may nonetheless be
subject to a selection bias. For one thing in order to establish a father-son link we require that
sons file an income tax return while still living in the family home at some point between
1982 and 1986. This implies that the son will have a SIN, and that it can be linked to the
father’s. Those sons who either do not have a father present, have left the household before
filing an income tax return, or happen not to file an income tax return in 1995 will not be part
of the analysis. As a result our data set likely underrepresents the members of the cohort who
had no attachment to the labour market during their teenage years, who left home before
establishing an attachment, who lived in homes headed by lone mothers, or who possibly have
little labour market attachment in their adult years.
10 In all these cases it is conceivable that
the data underrepresent members of the cohort who are prone to low income as adults. Our
selection rules will also exclude immigrants whose fathers entered the country after 1986.
The second issue involves the accuracy of reported earnings and income. In contrast to
survey data there is, in the context of a progressive income tax system, a distinct incentive to
under-report income to the tax authorities. However, what is particularly pertinent in the
context of our objectives is whether these incentives are very strong, whether they vary across
the income distribution, and if they have changed through time affecting fathers differently
than sons. It is difficult to assess the degree to which income is not reported or under-reported,
but it is conceivable that the incentive to do so may have been greater for the fathers in our
sample than for the sons. During the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s there were as many as13
10 income tax brackets, but in 1988 this was changed to just three. As a result there would
have been a stronger incentive throughout the income distribution for fathers to slightly under-
report their incomes than for sons, and would imply that intergenerational mobility will be
overstated.
It should be noted, however, that problems of these sort are not unique to our data. For
example, with respect to the sample selection problem Solon (1992, p.398) notes that the
representativeness of the PSID for intergenerational analysis has likely been affected by
sample attrition, low-income and high-income individuals being more likely to leave the
survey. The analysis sample he uses represents not quite 60 percent of the original cohort of
sons. Furthermore, income information from surveys are also subject to quality concerns. In
fact, these concerns have led Statistics Canada to link survey respondents to their tax records
and to use the tax data as the source of income information in the Survey of Labour and
Income Dynamics, a longitudinal Canadian survey similar to the PSID. Michaud et al. (1995)
compare the income information reported by a group of  respondents to their income tax
records and find that the survey responses tend to omit small amounts of income and to under-
report income from certain sources, most notably self-employment income and interest and
dividend income. The average amount of wage and salary income reported to the survey is
essentially the same as that found in the tax files, and while there are about 2.4 percent of
survey respondents who report some wage and salary income but have no corresponding
information in the tax files, there are exactly the same fraction who have some earnings in the
tax files but fail to report any to the survey (Michaud et al. 1995, tables 6 and 7).
In order to get a sense of some of these concerns we offer in Table 4 a comparison of
our administrative data to a nationally representative survey, the Survey of Consumer14
Finances (SCF). This cross-sectional survey is conducted each May and asks respondents
about the level and composition of their income during the previous year. We draw a sample
of all those men 29 to 32 years of age for the 1995 survey year, calculate a measure of
earnings and total market income that is as close as possible to the definitions used in our
analysis, and compare the distribution to three samples from the administrative data: all those
tax filers in 1995 who fall in the same age category, the subset of these we are able to link to a
father, and finally the subset who are the oldest among multiple matches to the same father
(and who form the basis for our analysis sample).
According to the SCF there were 1.015 million men aged 29 to 32 in 1995. This
contrasts with the 907,137 men in this age group who filed a 1995 income tax return, and the
497,242 we are able to link with a father. (This latter figure includes those who report zero or
negative income, and those whose fathers report zero or negative income). In other words, the
limitations of attempting to make a father-son link through the tax files in a way that allows us
to obtain the father’s income when the son is at a reasonably young age leads us to capture
about 55 percent of all tax filers in our cohort, and about 49 percent of the entire cohort.
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There are thus two ways in which a sample selection bias could enter our analysis: not all
individuals file an income tax return, not all filers are linked to their fathers.
Our data tend to slightly overstate the median income of the population. The median
earnings of this population is according to the SCF $18,700, almost $800 higher than the
median earnings of tax filers, but about $2,750 to $2,900 lower than the filers with fathers and
the oldest filers with fathers. A similar pattern holds in the case of market income. That being
said, however, the most striking difference between the survey data and the administrative
data concerns the extremes of the income distribution. The bottom percentile and even the15
bottom quintile tend to be higher in the SCF, while the top quintile and percentile are lower.
The survey data clearly under-represent individuals in the very top of the income distribution:
the maximum income, for example, is reported to be $157,000 in the SCF but it is over $4
million in the tax files. At the same time many more people with minimal earnings and
incomes are captured in the tax files. The longer tails of the distribution, particularly at the
upper end, contribute to greater cross-sectional inequality in the tax data as evidenced by the
standard deviation of the log earnings and income.
12
It is difficult for us to assess the impact of excluding non-filers from the analysis, but
we can assess the impact of being able to only link some of the filers to fathers. We divide the
total number of tax filers who are 29 to 32 in 1995 into two groups, those linked to a father
(and hence available for analysis), and those not linked (and hence excluded from analysis).
To determine whether the potential selection bias makes a difference for the estimate of b1 we
estimate a regression model with sample selection using Heckman’s two stage estimation
method. The selection rule is modeled using a probit equation. Since this requires maximum
likelihood estimation we choose a roughly 10 percent sample by using only those individuals
whose SINs end with the digit 5. The detailed results from the probit model are available upon
request, but to summarize the individuals in the analysis sample tend to be older; are much
less likely to live in Toronto and Montreal, and to a slightly lesser extent British Columbia;
and are more likely to be married than single, living in a common-law relationship, or
divorced. The underrepresentation of our sample in the major metropolitan areas is due to the
fact that most immigrants tend to settle in Toronto, Montreal, or Vancouver, and as mentioned
are not captured in our analysis unless they arrived before 1986 and had fathers who were16
attached to the labour market. The other results accord with our prior that the sample under
represents those prone to lower incomes.
The results from the second stage of the estimation are presented in Table 5. Also
presented for the sake of comparison are the results from a Least Squares regression using the
same 10 percent sample. Fathers’ earnings and incomes are measured using the five year
average. The Least Squares results from this smaller sample do not yield statistically different
results for the elasticity of son’s earnings and income with respect to father’s from those
presented in Table 2. More importantly, the results from the sample selection regression are
essentially the same as the Least Squares results. While the inverse Mill’s ratio is negative and
statistically significant, only the coefficient estimates for the son’s age are different between
the two sets of models.
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In this sense we conclude that our sample selection rules do not lend a major bias to
the findings. This still does not address the consequences of the fact that non-filers are
excluded from the analysis. Perhaps in this regard we should emphasize that Fortin and
Lefebvre (1998) use a representative survey and a different methodology than we do, yet
obtain essentially the same result. Their sample consists of 2,500 to 3,400 father-son pairs
from the 1986 and 1994 General Social Survey. This survey does not offer parental income
information, but it does capture their education and occupation. The authors use information
on income by occupation from the Canadian census to predict parental employment incomes.
Instrumental variables methods lead to an intergenerational elasticity between fathers and sons
of 0.157 (with a standard error of 0.034) for a cohort born between 1955 and 1969 (Fortin and
Lefebvre 1998, Table 4.4). They offer a host of results for other cohorts and different
instruments but all of their findings are in the order of 0.2. Thus, for a group of men roughly17
the same age as our cohort but with a nationally representative data set and with different
econometric techniques (ones that are probably upwardly inconsistent), they obtain essentially
the same result. This would seem to reinforce our conclusion that sample selection biases do
not appear to have a major influence upon our findings.
V. NON-LINEARITIES
The implication from these findings—that there is a good deal of intergenerational mobility in
Canada and perhaps even more than in the U.S.—is reinforced when transition matrices of the
sort presented earlier are examined. In deriving these we use the sample based upon a five
year average of the father’s earnings and a three year average of the son’s earnings between
1993 and 1995, both corrected for life cycle effects.
14 A transition matrix based upon quartiles
is presented in the first panel of Table 6. Individuals born to fathers with incomes in the tails
of the income distribution are certainly more likely to also have incomes in the tails. About 35
percent of sons born to fathers in the top quartile also had earnings in the top quartile, and
about 33 percent of those born to fathers in the bottom quartile were also in the bottom as
adults. The same figures at the bottom end of the income distribution are respectively 33 and
42 percent. In contrast, the middle part of the income distribution is characterized by close to
perfect mobility.
A finer disaggregation indicates distinct asymmetries at the very extremes of the
income distribution. This is illustrated by the decile transition matrix in Panel B of the table.
Eighteen percent of those born to fathers with incomes in the top 10 percent of the income
distribution also earned incomes that placed them in this decile, while almost 16 percent of
those born in the bottom decile remain at the bottom. At the same time the chances of falling18
one decile for those born at the top are about the same as the chances of rising one decile for
those born at the bottom.
The higher probabilities for the stayers at both the very top and very bottom of the
fathers’ income distribution has, in addition to representing non-linearity in the mobility
process, something to do with the floors and ceilings in the design of transition matrices. If
only a floor-ceiling effect were at work in say the quartile transition matrix—that is if the non-
linear pattern were due only to the fact that those at the very top are restricted from further
upward movement, and those at the very bottom from further downward mobility—we would
expect only the top and bottom deciles to show significant spikes in the transition
probabilities. In fact, the story is somewhat mixed. Substantially higher probabilities are
evident for the top and bottom quartiles, and also for the top and bottom deciles. In other
words, the finer disaggregation (that is the use of deciles) does indeed push the spike back. At
the same time, however, the ninth and second deciles remain higher than neighbouring
deciles. The same phenomenon occurs when percentiles are examined. A series of cross-
sections of the earnings percentile transition matrix is presented in Figure 1. The very top and
bottom percentiles show the sharpest spikes, revealing a floor-ceiling effect. However, those
born to fathers at the 95th percentile have a tendency to move up even further in the income
distribution. This suggests the possibility of a non-linearity in the underlying process. This
pattern may have a counterpart at the low end of the income distribution. For example, those
born to fathers at the 5th percentile have a tendency, albeit a weaker one, to move even lower
in the income distribution. The percentiles do in general reveal that the probability of upward
mobility is lower for sons from low income backgrounds, while the probability of upward
mobility is higher for sons from high income backgrounds. For example, the transition19
probabilities of moving within the lower quartile of the income distribution for those sons
whose fathers were at the 5th and 10th percentiles are generally above the  confidence interval
two standard deviations on either side of 10 percent, but generally at or below it for movement
into the top quartile. Conversely, those whose fathers were at the 95th percentile are more
likely to be in the top quintile.
These findings underscore the need to reassess the regression results by taking non-
linearities into account. We adopt non-parametric techniques as a way of both assessing the
validity of the log-linear model, and as a way of exploring the nature of the possible non-
linearities. Specifically, we employ nearest-neighbourhood estimators based upon locally
weighted least squares regressions.
15 This requires that the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables (called the smooth) be continuous, but makes no explicit
assumptions about the functional form linking them. In brief, the procedure involves defining
a window of observations around a particular value of the independent variable, say Yo(t-1). In
the case of nearest-neighbourhood estimators this window is defined as a fraction of the total
number of observations (N), and termed the span (a). Each of the a N observations within this
window are weighted using neighbourhood weights, w(Yi), such that the observations closest
to Yo(t-1) receive the largest weight. A weighted least squares regression is then estimated
using a polynomial of the regressor variable. The estimated coefficients from this regression
are used to predict the value of the dependent variable at Yo(t-1). This represents one point on
the smooth. A new value of Yo(t-1) and its neighbouring observations are then chosen and the
process is repeated.
16
There are three modeling choices that must be made: the weight function; the degree
of the polynomial; and the span. Cleveland and Loader (1995) suggest that subject to certain20
broad characteristics the choice of the weight function is not crucial, and we follow them in
using the tricubic function.
17 Our primary concern is with the first derivative of the functional
relationship linking father and son incomes. Since this is derived from the estimates of the
degree of the polynomial we use a reasonably flexible functional form, the cubic. Higher order
polynomials are likely to add little to the estimate of the first derivative at the cost of
increasing the computational burden, but lower order polynomials may miss some of the
curvature of the smooth at the cost of misspecifying the first derivative.
The choice of a is the most crucial of the three to be made. This choice embodies the
trade-off inherent in local regressions: that between bias and efficiency. A narrower span leads
to lower bias, but higher standard errors. Since our concerns are to obtain a sense of the non-
linearities in the smooth, and to assess the appropriateness of linear specification used in the
existing literature we are more inclined to error on the side of a more efficient estimate at the
risk of bias. We use a modified version of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
graphical inspection to choose the most appropriate value of a.
18
In order to ease the computational burden we employ a (roughly) 10% sample of our
data using the same selection criterion discussed earlier.
19 A scatter plot of the earnings and
income data is presented in Figure 2. These are the raw data expressed as natural logarithms
of income (adjusted for life cycle effects). There is clearly a positive correlation between
father and son incomes. (The straight line is the least squares fit.) However, there seems also
to be a concentration of data points with very low age adjusted log earnings levels (less than
about -8) for the father, for the son, and for both. For some small segment of the population
the age adjusted log earnings of the father is very low, and there is no apparent correlation
with the son’s income. Similarly a small number of sons earn minimal income in spite of their21
fathers’ income. This pattern is also present, but to a lesser degree, in the case of total market
income. These anomalous points are the reason that the results from the earnings-earnings
regressions described in Table 2 are less robust than those from the income-income
regressions. We believe these observations do not accurately approximate permanent earnings
or income.
20 In what follows we delete observations having a life-cycle adjusted log value of
less than –6.
A graph of the smooth relating father and son earnings and the associated first
derivative are presented in the two panels of Figure 3. The optimal value of  a (with respect to
minimizing the AIC) is 0.84. This value is used to derive the smooth depicted in Panel A.
(The straight line is the Least Squares fit.) The second Panel presents the corresponding
elasticity. The predicted value from the log-linear regression model clearly lies outside of the
95 percent confidence interval of the nearest neighbourhood estimate (given by the broken
lines), suggesting that it is a misspecification of the relationship between father and son
earnings. The elasticity from the non-parametric model is clearly not constant. In this panel
the vertical dotted lines represent the bottom and top percentile of the father’s earnings
distribution. At lower parts of the distribution the elasticity is zero or even negative and then
rises reaching a value of almost 0.4 at the very top. Over the bulk of the distribution the
elasticity displays an inverted V-shape, peaking at about 0.3 close to the median.
21
Figure 4 brings together the elasticities from three alternative models. The results
depicted in Panel B of Figure 3 are repeated as the line labeled EE, while the line labeled MM
refers to the elasticity between the total market income of sons and fathers, and the line
labeled EM refers to the elasticity between the sons’ earnings and the fathers’ total market
income. In each case the span is chosen according to the AIC (for EM it is 0.84 and for MM it22
is 0.76). All of the elasticities display the inverted V pattern between the 1st
  and 99th
percentiles, but the income-income elasticity is greater than the others throughout. It diverges
sharply from them at or even below the top percentile and attains a value of almost 0.8 at the
very top, more than double the earnings-earnings and earnings-income elasticities. A similar
pattern is evident at the bottom of the income distribution, but not to the same extreme.
We are somewhat more confident of the results at the upper tail of the income
distribution than at the bottom. As suggested earlier the selection rules used to construct our
data lead to an under-representation of individuals who are likely to have low incomes.
Although this selection bias does not influence the least squares results from the linear model,
this may not be the case in the non-parametric model. We cannot therefore draw definitive
conclusions about the nature of the intergenerational income elasticity below the first
percentile, and in our view the nature of the process determining intergenerational income
mobility at the very top and bottom of the income distribution requires in general more
analysis because non-parametric estimators tend to be less reliable at the extremes of the
distributions.
That being said the inverted V pattern seems to be a robust finding and has, along with
the observed patterns at the upper tail, an interpretation in the context of the borrowing
constraints model. As Becker and Tomes (1986) and Mulligan (1997) explain this model
implies a non-linear elasticity between parent and child earnings. Parents will invest in the
human capital of children up to the point that the marginal returns between human capital
investment and financial investment are the same, beyond that point further investments are
made as financial transfers. Parents who are borrowing constrained may not be able to attain
the optimal amount of human capital investment with the result that the correlation between23
parent and child earnings is stronger than it would otherwise be. However, the optimal amount
of human capital investment also depends positively upon the child’s ability. The parents who
are most likely to be borrowing constrained are lower income parents of high ability children.
If it is also the case that ability varies with the income of the parent—the higher the income of
the parent, the higher (on average) the ability of the child—then the inverted V pattern that we
uncover is not unreasonable. Over the lower half of the distribution the elasticity is rising
because parental income is rather low but child ability is increasing so that the borrowing
constraint becomes binding for a larger and larger fraction of the population. Over the upper
half of the distribution the elasticity is falling because parental income gradually becomes
high enough to finance post-secondary education, and the borrowing constraint is relaxed even
though child ability continues to rise. As parental income increases further financial transfers
made to children become increasingly more important. This is reflected in a much higher
elasticity between the incomes of fathers and sons than between their earnings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our exploration of the degree of intergenerational income mobility among Canadian men
leads to the conclusion that the intergenerational elasticity of father-son earnings and incomes
is on average about 0.2, an estimate that until recently was taken as the consensus value in the
United States. This finding is robust to several measurement and methodological issues raised
in the existing literature, including measurement error associated with transitory income
shocks, and life cycle differences between fathers and sons. However, the earnings-earnings
elasticities can be sensitive to the cut-off rules used to define the analysis sample. Since we
use administrative data associated with the Canadian income tax system we also pay specific24
attention to the possibility that sample selection bias may influence our results. In fact, we find
that our data tend to underrepresent those on the margins of the labour market, but that this
does not influence our estimate of the intergenerational elasticity of father and son incomes.
At the same time, however, we also uncover significant non-linearities in the relationship
between father and son incomes. The use of non-parametric methods leads to the suggestion
that log-linear models imply a mis-specification of the data generating process. Over the
course of the lower half of the fathers’ distribution the elasticity between father and son
earnings rises from zero to about 0.3, and then falls to 0.1 over the upper half. It rises again at
the very top of the income distribution reaching a value of about 0.4 the top percentile. The
elasticity between total market incomes is slightly higher and follows a similar pattern, but
rises to almost 0.8 at the top end of the distribution. This pattern can be interpreted in the
context of a borrowing constraints model of parental investment in the human capital of
children if child ability is assumed to be positively correlated with parental income.
In addition, Mulligan (1997) points out that policy can influence the degree of
intergenerational mobility: graduated estate taxes, progressive income taxes, and the
subsidization of college and university education may all be expected to influence the human
capital investments that parents make in their children. If the degree of intergenerational
mobility is the same across countries then it may be that differences in these policies have
little impact. However, this may not be the case if broader societal factors associated with
familial values and social structures also play a role. Canada may be a particularly relevant
country to study and juxtapose against the many studies of the United States since, as Card
and Freeman (1993) point out, the two countries have very similar labour markets, cultural
traditions, and living standards. These similarities raise the possibility of more clearly25
distinguishing the impact of institutional/policy differences on labour market outcomes. In
particular, there is no estate tax in Canada, income tax rates are in general higher and more
progressive than in the United States, and there has historically been greater access to high
quality post-secondary education.
The results from our log-linear specification offer no evidence that the
intergenerational elasticity of earnings or income is higher than 0.25, substantially below the
0.4 to 0.5 estimates found by many researchers using U.S. data. These results may, when
coupled with more institutional information, contribute to an understanding of the impact
these policies may have on intergenerational mobility. Our analysis highlights the value of
administrative data to this exercise, emphasizes the possibility that the log-linear model is a
mis-specification of the relationship between father and son earnings, and consequently
underscores the need to adopt flexible econometric techniques to explore potential non-
linearities in this relationship.26
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A. Total Earnings Number of Observations=339,951
Son’s Earnings in 1995 25,219 20,960 1 128 6,036 14,504 24,345 33,512 68,667 3,692,884
Father’s Earnings 1978-82 31,388 22,246 1 1.2 9,041 20,470 29,750 39,597 93,518 1,829,229
Log Son’s Earnings in 1995 9.796 1.239 0 4.852 8.705 9.582 10.100 10.420 11.137 15.122
Log Father’s Earnings 1978-82 9.981 1.459 0 0.182 9.110 9.927 10.301 10.587 11.446 14.419
B. Total Market Income Number of Observations=389,348
Son’s Market Income in 1995 25,386 24,158 1 314 6,071 13,842 23,822 33,345 77,324 4,161,596
Father’s Market Income 1978-82 35,586 35,275 1 2,627 13,380 22,148 31,372 42,327 130,539 8,105,156
Log Son’s Market Income in 1995 9.820 1.085 0 5.749 8.711 9.535 10.078 10.415 11.256 15.241
Log Father’s Market Income 1978-82 10.268 0.738 0 7.874 9.502 10.005 10.354 10.653 11.779 15.908Table 2
THE EFFECT OF TRANSITORY FLUCTUATIONS ON THE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES
OF THE INTEREGENERATIONAL EARNINGS AND INCOME ELASTICITIES













1979 0.110 [343,551] 0.123
(0.003) (0.003)
[340,824] 0.113 [341,527] 0.126
(0.003) (0.003)
1980 0.101 [342,433] 0.123 [341,181] 0.131
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
[341,283] 0.120 [342,038] 0.129 [339,951]
(0.003) (0.003)












1979 0.146 [397,559] 0.187
(0.003) (0.003)
[402,078] 0.172 [393,965] 0.191
(0.003) (0.003)
1980 0.140 [398,871] 0.180 [391,352] 0.194
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[403,347] 0.167 [396,174] 0.184 [389,348]
(0.003) (0.003)







( ) indicates standard errors based upon White’s heteroscedastic robust estimator,  [ ] indicates sample size33
Table 3
INTERGENERATIONAL ELASTICITIES FOR VARIOUS SAMPLES AND SPECIFICATIONS:
FATHER AND SON EARNINGS AND MARKET INCOME





A. Sample Selection Rules
1. Average Income Over Five Years ³ $1 0.131 (0.003) 0.194 (0.003)
2. Income in Each of Five Years ³ $1 0.228 (0.006) 0.236 (0.004)
3. Income in Each of Five Years ³ $100 0.227 (0.003) 0.231 (0.003)
4. Income in Each of Five Years ³ $1,000 0.237 (0.003) 0.239 (0.002)
5. Income in Each of Five Years ³ $3,000 0.242 (0.003) 0.236 (0.002)
B. Life Cycle Adjustments
1. Quadratic in Age of Fathers and Sons 0.131 (0.003) 0.194 (0.003)
2. No Controls for Age 0.131 (0.003) 0.193 (0.003)
3. Dummy variables for Age of Sons 0.131 (0.003) 0.194 (0.003)
4. Quartic in Age of Fathers and Sons 0.132 (0.003) 0.196 (0.003)
5. Oldest Sons born in 1963 0.140 (0.006) 0.197 (0.006)
6. Oldest Sons born in 1966 0.117 (0.007) 0.197 (0.008)
7. All Siblings 0.129 (0.003) 0.196 (0.003)
8. Controls for Marital Status 0.134 (0.003) 0.193 (0.003)
C. Choice of Regressor
1. Earnings 0.131 (0.003)
2. Total Market Income 0.192 (0.004)
D. Estimation Method
Average Income Over Five Years ³ $1
1. Least Squares 0.131 (0.003) 0.194 (0.003)
2. Median Regression 0.068 (0.001) 0.192 (0.002)
Income in Each of Five Years ³ $1
3. Least Squares 0.228 (0.006) 0.236 (0.004)






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LEAST SQUARES AND SAMPLE SELECTION REGRESSIONS OF THE ELASTICITY OF SON’S
EARNINGS AND INCOME WITH RESPECT TO FATHER’S EARNINGS AND INCOME















Constant 0.848 14.8 -0.479 14.7
(6.45) (6.99) (5.19) (5.86)








Son’s Age 0.416 -0.391 0.468 -0.415
(0.422) (0.457) (0.340) (0.383)
Son’s Age Squared -0.00612 0.00625 -0.00685 0.00657
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Father’s Age 0.0225 0.0259 0.0170 0.0214
(0.012) (0.012) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Father’s Age Squared -0.00025 -0.00027 -0.00018 -0.00021




2 0.0303 0.0365 0.0205 0.0309
Number of Observations 33,660 38,637
Note: The samples used consist of all those father-son pairs in which the (eldest) son’s SIN ends with 5, and
had no missing values for the variables used in the probit selection equation. The probit results are given in
the appendix. l is the inverse Mill’s ratio derived from these results. Father’s earnings and income are
defined as the logarithm of the annual average between 1978 and 1982. This average had to be equal to or
greater than one to be included in the sample.
( ) indicates the standard error of the estimate.36
Table 6
FATHER-SON EARNINGS TRANSITION MATRICES
A. Quartile Transition Matrix
Son’s Earnings
Top Third Second Bottom
Top 0.345 0.248 0.205 0.202
Third 0.271 0.269 0.241 0.219

















Bottom 0.172 0.220 0.281 0.327











Top 0.180 0.132 0.112 0.096 0.087 0.082 0.075 0.076 0.078 0.084
9
th 0.148 0.128 0.116 0.102 0.095 0.083 0.082 0.083 0.084 0.079
8
th 0.122 0.123 0.116 0.107 0.102 0.094 0.090 0.085 0.082 0.079
7
th 0.108 0.114 0.111 0.107 0.105 0.098 0.093 0.093 0.088 0.085
6
th 0.093 0.104 0.110 0.109 0.107 0.103 0.099 0.096 0.091 0.087
5
th 0.083 0.096 0.106 0.109 0.104 0.106 0.104 0.104 0.095 0.094
4
th 0.071 0.085 0.095 0.106 0.110 0.112 0.110 0.109 0.104 0.099
3
rd 0.066 0.078 0.085 0.096 0.107 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.111 0.109
2


















Bottom 0.069 0.070 0.074 0.083 0.087 0.097 0.110 0.117 0.137 0.158
Note: Life cycle adjusted data from a sample of 334,018 father-son observations. The son’s earnings are
averaged over 1993 to 1995 and age adjusted as described in the text, and the father’s earnings are averaged over
1978 and 1982 and age adjusted. The Immobility Index for the quartile transition matrix is 0.304. For the decile
transition matrix it is 0.126.
Source: Calculations by Authors from Administrative Income tax data, Statistics CanadaFigure 1
PROBABILITY OF SON’S EARNINGS PERCENTILE GIVEN FATHERS EARNINGS PERCENTILE
Note: Father and son incomes are age adjusted as described in the text. The sample size is 334,018. The 1st percentile for the top left hand graph (Father’s
Percentile =1) is out of range at 0.0329. The 99th and 100th percentiles for the bottom right hand graph (Father’s Percentile =100) are also out of range at 0.0371
and 0.0895.Figure 2
SCATTER PLOT OF SON’S LOG EARNINGS AGAINST
FATHER’S LOG EARNINGS AND LOG MARKET INCOME
A. Son’s Earnings – Father’s Earnings B. Son’s Earnings – Father’s Market Income
Note: The data are age adjusted, and expressed as logarithms with the straight lines being the least squares
estimates. In Panel A there are 33,660 observations, and the slope (standard error) of the least squares line
is 0.146 (0.0047). In Panel B the number of observations is 36,039, and the slope (standard error) of the
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NEAREST NEIGHBOURHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FATHER AND SON EARNINGS
A. Predicted Values B. Elasticity
Note: Panel A presents the predicted relationship between Father and Son life cycle adjusted log Earnings
using the estimation procedure described in the text with a span of 0.84. The dashed lines are two standard
errors from the estimated relationship, and the straight line is the least squares estimate. Panel B is the
estimated elasticity, with the vertical dashed lines representing the 1
st and 99

























































































































THE ELASTICITY OF SON’S EARNINGS AND TOTAL MARKET INCOME
WITH RESPECT TO FATHER’S EARNINGS AND TOTAL MARKET INCOME
Note: The line labeled MM refers to the elasticity between the total market incomes of sons and fathers, the line
labeled EM refers to the elasticity between the earnings of sons and the total market income of fathers, and the
line EE refers to the elasticity between father and son earnings. All of the results are based upon Nearest
Neighbourhood estimation described in the text. For MM the span is 0.76, for EM and EE it is 0.84. The vertical
broken lines represent the 1
st and 99
th  percentiles of the father’s age-adjusted log total market income.






























































DATA DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITIONS
We link the Social Insurance Numbers (SINs) of fathers and sons by using the T1 Family File
(T1FF). The SIN is a unique individual identifier, and the T1FF is a dataset of T1 records that
has been processed in order to match members of each tax filer’s family. (T1 forms are the
main annual tax returns filed by individuals in Canada, and the T1FF incorporates the
universe of tax filers.) A variety of matching strategies are employed to identify family
members, and imputation processes are used to add non-tax filing members of the family and
to complete missing information. Couples (including spouses and common law couples) are
linked using SIN codes and spousal SIN codes when indicated on the T1, as well as name and
address information. Children are matched to their parents using name and address fields.
More detail on the construction of the T1FF is given by Harris and Lucaciu (1994).
Father-son pairs are drawn from the T1FF for several years (1982 to 1986) in order to
improve the coverage of our sample and reduce the scope of a sample selection bias. The
algorithm is presented in Figure A-1. We retain the earliest father-child link  in the event that
a child is matched to different fathers in different years. Only non-imputed fathers and sons
are retained. (The father may not be the biological father, but rather should be thought of as
the male household head.) Sons are restricted to having been born between 1963 and 1966.
Three classes of sons are excluded because the father-child link was not identified: those sons
who did not file an income tax return between 1982 and 1986 while still at home; those who
filed a tax return and were linked to a family that had no father; and those who filed a tax
return but were not linked to a family.
Using these father-son pairs of SINs we obtain income information from the fathers’
1978 to 1982 T1 forms, and the sons’ 1995 T1. We are able to link the 1995 T1 records of
497,242 sons to the T1 data of a father in at least one of the years from 1978 to 1982.
Restricting this sample to include only the oldest sons in cases where multiple individuals
were matched to the same father yields a sample size of 448,196.
Our analysis is based upon two income measures: Earnings and Total Market Income.
Earnings includes earnings taken from T4 slips as well as reported directly by tax filers. (T4s
are issued by employers and must be remitted with the T1 form. Commissions earned by paid
workers are included. In 1995 the minimum income for which a T4 must be issued was $500
current dollars. Previously this was $250, again in current dollars.) Earnings also includes
“Other Employment Income,” which is defined as the sum of adult training allowances, net
research grants, tips and gratuities, royalties from a work or invention and director’s fees.
These are reported directly on the T1 by tax filers. (We compared the raw T4 data generated
by employers to the earnings reported by individuals on the T1 and found that they matched
up almost exactly. The exception to this was at the very bottom of the income distribution
because of the minimum income determining whether a T4 is issued.) “Total Market Income”
includes income from Earnings, Net Income from Self-Employment, Income from Assets, and42
Other Income. (Asset income has four components: [1] dividends from Canadian
corporations; [2] net income from rental properties; [3] net capital gains or losses; [4] income
from interest and other investments) Some elements of Other Employment Income—royalties
and directors fees in particular—do not reflect income from a employer-employee relationship
and might be more correctly considered as a part of Market Income. However, we are not able
to separate these elements and in total consider it more appropriate to add them to earnings.
(This distinction, however, does not influence our results. The least squares estimates based
upon a measure of Earnings net of Other Employment Income are the same as those using the
sum of the two measures.) More detail on our definitions are available upon request.43
Figure A-1
ALGORITHM USED IN THE CREATION OF THE FATHER-SON LINKS
1982 T1FF 1983 to 1986 T1FF
Is this a Father Son 
Pair?





Is the Son 16 to 19 
years old?
Was the Son 16 to 19 




Does the Son have a 
SIN?











Add to Analysis 
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ENDNOTES
1  The correlation coefficient between father and son log incomes (r) is equal to b1 if the
degree of inequality (in the cross-sectional income distribution) does not change across
generations, otherwise  b1 = r[s (Yi(t)) / s (Yi(t-1)) ], where the Yi are measured in logarithms
and s signifies the standard deviation of the variables in parentheses. Mulligan (1997, 164-70)
points out that the changes in inequality over time depend upon the value of   b1.
2 For example, if the income levels in the above relationship are expressed as natural
logarithms then b1 represents the elasticity of a child’s income with respect to the parental
income. In Canada during 1981 the ratio of the average income of males (working full-year,
full-time) in the top quintile to those in the bottom quintile was 3.84. Using this figure the
income advantage conferred to someone born to a father with income in the top quintile
relative to someone born to a father with income in the bottom quintile for different values of  
b1 is as follows:
b1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Income
Advantage 14% 31% 50% 71% 96%
3 While numerous sociological studies exist, they deal with “social mobility,” and are
concerned with changes in occupational status of parents and children. Examples include
McRoberts and Selbee (1981), Béland (1987), Isajiw, Sev'er, and Driedger (1993), Creese,
Guppy, and Meissner (1991), Fournier, Butlin, Giles (1995), and Wanner and Hayes (1996).
Boyd et.al. (1981) discuss the correlation between educational attainment and occupational45
status of fathers with sons and daughters stratified by ancestry and language. McRoberts
(1980) relates these background characteristics to the incomes of sons in an analysis that is
probably closets in spirit to those described in the text.
4  Haveman and Wolfe (1994) and Peters (1992) add a host of family background
characteristics that are motivated by Becker’s theory. Hill and Duncan (1987), Corcoran,
Gordon, Laren, and Solon (1992), Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klabanov, and Sealand (1993),
Solon, Page and Duncan (1997) and Corak and Heisz (1998) also study the effects of family
background as well as neighbourhood characteristics. Cooper, Durlauf and Johnson (1993)
stratify their sample by neighbourhood in an attempt to uncover areas of permanent poverty or
affluence. They find that families residing in affluent and poor neighbourhoods have higher
income persistence than those in middle class families. However, they are forced to deal with
a rather broad definition of neighbourhood and a rather small sample.
5  The “father” is not necessarily the biological father, but should rather be thought of as
the male household head. Stepfathers, for example, will be included. To be included in the
analysis the father must have been born between 1908 and 1952 inclusive.
6  We also derived a measure of earnings that includes earnings from paid employment
and net self-employment income. The analysis of these data is available upon request.
7  It may be argued that our cohort of men is still too young and therefore that we are not
measuring their permanent income accurately: at 29 to 32 years of age, some members of the
sample may be just beginning to reap the benefits of extensive investments in human capital
made during their twenties and will go on to move up in the income distribution. In fact, the
age of this cohort is not out of line with that used in the existing U.S. literature, but we46
attempt a very rough assessment of this issue by examining the income dynamics over a ten
year period of a group of men who were 29 to 32 years of age in 1985, that is in our age group
but a decade earlier. About 24 percent of these individuals occupied the same decile in the
income distribution in 1995 as they did in 1985, and about 55 percent were either in the same
decile or one decile above or below. By way of comparison 27 percent of a group of men ten
years older (39 to 42) in 1985 occupied the same income decile in 1995, and 59 percent were
in the same or one decile above or below their 1985 decile. This suggests that the pattern of
income dynamics is not too different for those in their late 20s and early 30s as it is for a
cohort in their late 30s and early 40s, that is for a cohort that may be considered to be well
along the life-time income trajectory.
8  When income is averaged the average age over the equivalent time interval is used.
9  The correlation coefficients associated with these elasticities, calculated in the manner
described in note 1 are all uniformly less than 0.2 and not subject to as much variation. The
correlation coefficients associated with row 1 of the table are 0.154 for earnings and 0.132 for
income, and they range respectively from roughly 0.12 to 0.17, and from 0.11 to 0.19 for the
other scenarios.
10  Mitchell, Wister, and Burch (1989) find that the average age of final home leaving is
about 20 years for those oldest children of biological parents, with men tending to leave home
about nine months later than women. While this might be taken to suggest that
underrepresentation in our data may not be too severe, it should be noted that their analysis
refers to a wide spectrum of individuals leaving home during the 1950s through to the mid
1980s and may not be entirely comparable to the cohort we examine.47
11  In the T1FF this issue of undercoverage is addressed by imputing children to certain
families according to a rule based upon the age of the mother and her marital status. We do
not use any imputed information. Clark (1997) offers a more detailed comparison between the
SCF and T1 based administrative data, pointing out some of the conceptual and
methodological differences between the two sources. She notes that the difference between
the population and employment counts between them is due to the exclusion of non-filers
from the tax data, and that in 1995 the average earnings of this group must have been about
$1,500.
12  Further, it is well known that income reported to surveys suffers from a rounding
problem reflecting the fact that respondents have a “digit preference” and tend to report
figures that are multiples of ten, a hundred, or one thousand. Rounding errors may be more
important at the upper end of the income distribution,. Almost 54 percent of SCF respondents
report their earnings in a multiple of $100, 46 percent in a multiple of $1,000, and 23 percent
in a multiple of $10,000. Only 12.6 percent of the oldest filers with fathers used a multiple of
$100, and 11.7 percent used a multiple of either $1,000 or $10,000. The differences between
the two sources are even greater when market income is considered: 46 percent of SCF
respondents report in multiples of $100, but only 5.6 percent of oldest tax filers; 37 and 14
percent used respectively a multiple of $1,000 and $10,000, while 4.6 percent of filers did so.
13  We also conducted a similar analysis using the son’s earnings as the regressand and
the father’s total market income as the regressor, obtaining a least squares estimate (and
standard error) of 0.191 (0.009). The Heckman corrected estimate was 0.194 (0.009).48
14  The sons’ incomes are averaged over three years since transitory fluctuations may lead
to an overstatement of mobility when depicted in a transition matrix, even if they don’t bias
the regression results. In fact, using income from only 1995 does not make a difference to the
results. The data used are the residuals from the regression Yi = g0 + g1Age + g2Age
2, where
i=father,son and Y represents the level of income (expressed in constant 1986 dollars).
15  See Altman (1992) and Härdle (1990,1991) for an introduction to non-parametric
techniques. Our approach is based upon the work of Cleveland and Devlin (1988), Cleveland,
Devlin, and Grosse (1988), Cleveland (1993, pp, 94-101),  and particularly Cleveland and
Loader (1995). Our analysis uses the LOCFIT program written by Loader, which is available
at http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/departments/sia/project/locfit/index.html.
16  The algorithm is actually more complicated then described and does not require as
many regressions to be run as the number of observations. See Cleveland, Devlin and Grosse
(1988) for details.
17  Specifically, if u= Yi(t-1)- Yo(t-1), we desire a function that is peaked at u=0, decays
smoothly to 0 as u increases in absolute value, and is nonzero on a bounded interval. The
tricubic weight function is: wu u
uu () { ||
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18  The references cited in footnote 15, particularly those by Cleveland and his co-authors
point out that choosing a in a mechanical way by relying upon an indicator like the AIC will
often lead to incorrect choices. The choice of a should not be made without reference to the
objectives of the analysis. Further, as Härdle (1990) points out, minimizing such a criterion
with respect to the choice of the smooth does not necessarily lead to an optimal choice for the49
first derivative of the smooth. For these reasons we use the AIC as a guide, but only as a
guide, to the choice of a. An often used rule of thumb is to adopt a value of 0.7.
19 The sample is determined by choosing all those sons whose Social Insurance Number
ended with the digit 5 subject to their earnings or income being greater than or equal to one,
and subject to the five year average of the corresponding measure for the father also being
greater than or equal to one.
20  We looked more closely at these outliers and found that while earnings was very low
many of these individuals had higher total incomes (total market income including
government transfers). There was a group on the margins of the labour market receiving
Unemployment Insurance benefits and Social Assistance. Others were receiving Workmen’s
Compensation or were living off grants, fellowships, or other benefits, indicating (in some
cases) continued participation in post-secondary education. Some of the fathers also reported
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan income. Using a cut-off of –8 does not change the findings.
21  Other values of a were also explored. A value of 0.7 does not lead to very different
results, except possibly at the upper tail where the elasticity reaches 0.5 as opposed to being
just under 0.4 when a is set to 0.84. A value of 0.9 appears to oversmooth the data,
eliminating the increase in the elasticity at log age-adjusted earnings above two.